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AGENCY-MASTER AND SERVANT---'REsPONDEAT SUPER1OR--ScoPE OF EMPLOY-
MENT;-The plaintiffs rented space in their garage to the defendants. The
servant of the latter, while drawing gasoline for his masters' car, lighted a
cigarette and negligently dropped the blazing match into a pool of the fuel. The
resulting conflagration destroyed the building. The plaintiffs sued the defendants
for the damage. Held (on other grounds), that the defendants were liable but
that the servant's smoking was not within.the scope of his employment so as to
render his masters responsible for the consequences thereof. Jefferies and A.
and R. Atkey and Co., Ltd., v. Derbyshire Farmers, Ltd. (192o, K. B.) 36
T. L. R. 825.
The court followed the law as laid down in a previous decision: that, if a
master gives a servant certain work to do, he necessarily trusts him for the man-
ner in which it is to be done; and he is consequently held liable for the tort
committed by the servant, provided that it was not done from caprice, but in the
course of this employment Bayley v. Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry.
(1872) L. R. 7 C. P. 415. The court then decided that smoking was not neces-
sary to the proper accomplishment of the defendants' business and was, there-
fore, not within the scope of the servant's employment. The basis of the
liability imposed by the doctrine of resPondeat superior has been stated as
resting on the authority, or implied authority, from the master to the servant to
do the act in question. Attorney General v. Siddon and Binns (183o, Exch.) i
Tyrw. 41. It has also been said to rest on the fact-that the act was done "for
the master's benefit" Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank (1867) L. R. 2 Exch.
259. But these reasons fail in cases where the liability is imposed on the master
even though the servant's act was expressly contrary to his instructions, or even
though the act was malicious and not at all to the benefit of the master. McCann
v. Consolidated Traction Co. (897) 59 N. J. L. 481, 36 Atl. 888; Williams v.
Southern Ry. ('9o3) 115 Ky. 32o, 73 S. W. 779. The doctrine seems rather
to rest on the broader foundation of public policy, that a means is required of
forcing masters to keep continual watch over the conduct of their servants, so that
irresponsible persons may not be given the opportunity of inflicting damage on
others. See Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability (1916) 26 YAm LAw JouR-
NAL, i05, 116. It is now universally recognized that the master is responsible for
the torts of his servant committed while the latter is acting 'within the scope of
his employment. 6 Labatt, Master and Servant (2d ed. 1913) 6692; Roberts v.
Kinley (1913) 89 Kan. 885, 132 Pac. i18o. Torts committed by the servant in
the course of his employment and in the exercise of his authority, with a view
to the furtherance of his master's business, *and not for a purpose personal to
himself, are within the scope of his employment. Barrett v. Minneapolis, S. P.
& S. Ste. M. Ry. (i9o8) io6 Minn. 5I, IIT.N. W. 1O47. When the tort is of a
fraudulent nature and occurs in the course of the employment, liability is
imposed although it was not committed with a view to the furtherahce of the
master's business. McCord v. W. U. Tel. Co. (i888) 39 Minn. 181, 39 N. W. 315.
When the servant, at the time of the commission of the tort, is engaged in
executing his own private purpose and at the same time is pursuing his master's
business, the law will not undertake to fix with precision the line which separates
the act of the servant from the act of the individual. Gracey v. Belfast Tram-
'way Co. [igoi, Q. B.] 2 Ir. 322; South Covington & C. St. Ry. Co. v. Cleveland
(19o7) 30 Ky. L. R. 1O72, ioo S. W. 283. Referring now to the principal case,
and taking into consideration the universality of the habit of smoking, it would
seem that a more reasonable view is that the defendants' servant was pursuing
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negligently his masters' business, rather than that he was embarking upon an
enterprise all his own. Certainly if the suit were directed against the servant
instead of the master, the former could not be sued merely for lighting his
cigarette, but for the negligent use of the plaintiffs' premises: See Williams v.
Jones (1865, Exch. Ch.) 3 H. & C. 62, 61o (dissenting opinion of J. Blackburn).
In this country, this question would ordinarily be left -to the jury, unless the
departure from the employer's business is of a marked and decided character.
Moon v.Mathews (igio) 227 P a. 488, 76 Atl. 219; 18 R. C. L. 796.
AGENCY-WORKMEN'S CoMPESA'rIoN-INuRuES ARISING "OUT OF AND IN THE
COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT"-APPLICATION OF NEW YORK'S "HAzAmuj0s" STATUTE.-
An employee in a confectionery store was sent by his employer, who was also
proprietor of an adjoining saloon, to arrange bail for a customer who had been
arrested in the .saloon. While at the police station, the employee was pushed
downstairs by an officer; and for the injury thus received he sought compensa-
tion under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The New York
act provides compensation for injuries "arising out of and in the course of"
certain enumerated hazardous occupations, of which the confectionery business
is one. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the employer was not liable, because,
when the accident occurred, that which the employee was doing was not within
his contract of employment, and was not such service as'is designated as haz-
ardous. Sabatelli v. De Robertis and Insurance Co. (ig2o) 192 App. Div. 873, 183
N. Y. Supp. 796.
Under the English and most of the American compensation acts an injury,
in order to be compensable, must have arisen "out of and in the course of the
employment." This provision covers injuries received while the workman was
doing the duty which he was employed to perform. McNicoFs Case (1913) 215
Mass. 497, io2 N. E. 697. It also covers injuries received while he was doing
additional acts with the consent, or at the direction, of his employer. Matter of
Grieb v. Hammerle & Casualty Co. (1918) 22 N. Y. 382, 118 N. E. 8o5. Nor
will compensation be denied him if he was injured when he departed from his
usual avocation in order to perform some act necessary to be done for his em-
ployer. Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co. (1916) go Conn. 539, 97 Atl. io2o. And
the fact that the risk was a common one, such as that of street accidents, is no
longer considered material. Redner v. H. C. Faber & Son Co. (1918) 223 N. Y.
379, 1ig N. E. 842; Dennis v. White [1917] A. C. 479. The statutes are remedial
and are to be broadly interpreted. See Matter of Moore v. Lehigh Valley Ry.
(1915) 169 App. Div. 177, 187, 154 N. Y. Supp. 62o, 627. The facts of the prin-
cipal case bring it clearly within these principles, and recovery would have been
allowed under almost all of the compensation acts. But New York is one of the
few states that requires that the injury be received through a hazardous employ-
ment The earlier decisions were conflicting. Some required thdt not only the
employer's business but also the employee's duties be hazardous. Matter of
Bargey z'. Massaro Macaroni Co. (1916) 218 N. Y. 410, 113 N. E. 4o7. But others
held that the employee's duties need not be hazardous if incidental to the em-
ployer's hazardous business. Fogarty v. National Biscuit Co. (1917) 221 N. Y. 20,
x116 N. E. 346. The amendment of 1916 broadened the scope of the statute along
this latter line, and also included injuries received by an employee doing hazard-
ous work in a non-hazardous employment Matter of Dose v. Moehle Litho-
graphic Co. (1917) 221 R. Y. 401, 117 N. E. 616. It seems clearly unreasonable
and against public policy to require an employee to stop and consider whether or
not the command of his employer involves acts which are not incidental to the
employment, in order. that he may be certain that he will receive compensation if
injured while obeying the order. Cf. Hartz v. Hartford Co., supra. It would
seem that the principal case is not in accord with sound .authority and the spirit
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of the statute. The majority holding appears to rely upon a consideration of the
employer's policy of insurance, and upon an earlier New York case. Newman v.
Newman (igi6) 218 N. Y. 325, 113 N. E. 332. But the details of the employer's
insurance surely cannot affect the rights of the employee; and the decision relied
upon is readily distinguishable, for the court in that case based its decision upon
the ground that the employee was neither actually engaged in a hazardous em-
ployment when injured, nor was his employer conducting a hazirdous enterprise.
Bnus AND NomFs-HoLunn IN Dum Couns-EFncT oF N. I. L. ox EAR.IER
STATUTE MAKING GAmBLNG TRANSACTIONS VoiD.-The defendant's testator gave
his promissory note to the payee in settlement of a gambling debt. A statute-
made all gaming transactions void and imposed a penalty on gamblers. Subse-
quent to that statute, the Negotiable Instruments Law had been adopted. The
plaintiff sued to recover the amount he, as guarantor of the note, had to pay on it.
Held, that the plaintiff could not recover, even if he was a bona fide holder in due
course without knowledge of the transaction, as the N. I. L. had not repealed the
earlier statute. Levy v. Doerhoefer's Ei'r. (192o, Ky.) 222 S. W. 515.
It has sometimes been held that statutes previously in force declaring void in-
struments given for gaming purposes, or upon usurious interest and the like, are
impliedly repealed by the N. I. L. Wirt v. Stubblefield (19oo) 17 App. D. C.
283; Wood v. Babbitt (1907, Circuit D, N. J.) i49 Fed. 818, 822; contra, Perry
Savings Bank v. Fitzgerald (1914) 167 Iowa, 446, i4g N. W. '47; Raleigh Co.
Bank v. Poteet (914) 74 W. Va. 51x, 82 S. E. 332., This conflict is not surpris-
ing, for courts may be expected to construe the several sections of the N. I. I.
with reference to the policy of their respective states. In some jurisdictions, com-
mercial considerations will be paramount; in others the desire to protect the weak
or to prevent public offenses will prevail. See Chemical Nat. Bank v. Kellogg
(igo5) 183 N. Y. 92, 95, 75 N. E. IIO3, iio4; Alexander v. Hazelrigg (1io6) 123
Ky. 677, 683, 97 S. W. 353, 354. The claim that the N. I. L. repeals such an
earlier statute appears to be based chiefly .on section 55 (title of holder defective
only when instrument was obtained by him for an illegal consideration) -and
section 57 (holder in due course takes free from any defenses available to priior
parties among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument against
all patties liable thereon). See Brannan, Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed.
ig2o) 184 ff.; Crawford, Negotiable Instruments Law (3d ed. 198o) 71 ff. To
remove any doubt, some states have modified these sections to provide expressly
that holders in due course shall not recover on gaming instruments, etc. See
Brannan, op. cit. i8o, 2oi. The language of sections 55 and 57 does not seem to
make these modifications necessary. The courts, independently of the N. I. L.,
have long recognized- a distinction between notes expressly declared void by
statute and those obtained for an illegal consideration, denying recovery on the
former to anybody, and graditing it on the latter to a holder in due course.
Booruwm v. Claflin (8go) 122 N. Y. 385, 25 N. E. 360; see Anion, Contract
(Corbin's ed. I919) 311, notes 2 and 3. If a note is void by statute, it never had
any operative effect and no "parties" were ever "liable thereon" under section "7-
In contrast with a mere defect in title, a real defense (a defense in the thing
itself) follows the instrument against ill the world regardless of the merits of the
holder. Laipson z. First Nat. Bank (1907) 31 Ky. L. R. 318, 102 S. W. 324;
Sabine v. Paine (II8) 223 N. Y. 4O, i19 N. E. 849. This would seem to clear
up the meaning of section 57 and avoid the awkward definition sometimes given
of the word "liable," as used in this connection. See Martin v. Hess (1914)
23 Pa. Dist. Ct 195, 197. In interpreting a statute, it will be presumed in the
absence of specific words to the contrary, that the legislature did not intend to
unsettle another general statute, the entire subject-matter of which is not directly
or necessarily involved in the later act. Twentieth St. Bank v. Jacobs (1914) 74
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W. Va. 525, 82 S. E. 320 (gaming statute, followed by N. L L.). It is interesting
to note that a great commercial state like New York, after a seemingly hopeless
conflict in the lower courts, has recently settled the matter in favor of the view
that the N. I. L. does not repeal the earlier statute, and gives the holder in due
course of such an instrument no protection. Sabine v. Paine, supra; see (1918)
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 85. It would seem that the instant case represents the
majority view, and is perfectly sound.
CARRIERS-NEGLIGENcE-LIABILITY FOR GOODS IMPROPERLY PAcKED.-The plaintiff
delivered goods for carriage to the defendant railway company, which, to the
knowledge of the company, were improperly packed. Owing to the defective
packing, the goods were damaged during transit Held, that the railway com-
pany was not liable. Gould v. Southeastern and Chatham Ry. [1920] 2 K. B. I86.
One of the exceptions to the carrier's common-law liability arises where the
injuries are due to the improper packing of the goods. Carpenter v. Bait. & 0.
Ry. (I9o6, Del. Super. Ct) 6 Penn: 15, 64 Atl. 252; Northwestern Marble & Tile
Co. v. Williams (I915) 128 Minn. 514, 151 N. W. 419. That a carrier may reject
goods known to be defectively packed is a well settled principle. Truax v. Phila.
W. & B. Ry. (873, Del. Super. Ct) 3 Houst. 233. If the carrier accepts goods
without knowledge of the improper packing, the authorities agree that it is re-
lieved of all liability. Morris v. Wier (1897) 20 Misc. 586, 46 N. Y. Supp. 413;
Richardson & Sisson v. N. E. Ry. (I872) L. R. 7 C. P. 75. But where there is
no written evidence that the shipper assumes the risk and the carrier accepts
goods which it knows are defectively packed or which, by the exercise of reason-
able care, it could have observed were improperly packed, there is conflict.
Many courts have held that since the carrier had the privilege of rejecting the
goods and waived this privilege, then the common-law liability attaches. Calender-
Vanderhoof Co. v. C. B. & Q. Ry. (i9o6) 99 Minn. 295, io9 N. W. 4oz; Atlantic
Coast Line Ry. v. Rice (igio) 169 Ala. 265, 52 So. 918. Others, on the contrary,
have held, in accord with the ,instant case, that the duty of the carrier is simply
to carry the goods in the condition offered. Goodman v. Oregon Ry. and Nav.
Co. (1892) 22 Ore. 14, 28 Pac. 8%; Ross v. Troy & B. Ry. (1876) 49 Vt 364.
The burden, however, is on the carrier to show that the injury was due to
improper packing and not to any fault on its part. Union Express Co. v. Graham
(1875) 26 Ohio St. 595. But where both the carrier and the shipper are negligent,
the carrier is liable, the negligence of the shipper being considered in mitigation of
damages. McCarthy & Baldwin v. L. & N. Ry. (1893) 1O2 Ala. 193, 14 So. 370;
Atlanta W. P. Ry. v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co. (igio) 135 Ga. I3, 68 S. E. lO39.
CoNTRAcTs-CoNsiDERATIo-AccoR AND SATISFAcTIoN-AccEPTANcE OF PART
MISTAKENLY BELIEVED TO BE THE WHoLE.-The plaintiff, who had insured his
store )yith two companies, surrendered one of his policies for cancellation.
Shortly thereafter his store burned. Assuming that the surrender did not operate
as a discharge and that both policies were in force, the plaintiff accepted a pro-
portionate share of the loss as a full settlement of his claim on the second policy.
Under Rev. St. Neb. 1913, sec. 3208, however, surrender with request for can-
cellation amounted to a cancellation. The plaintiff sued for the difference be-
tween the proportion paid and the agreed amount of the loss, all of which was
due under the policy issued by the defendant company. Held, that the plaintiff
might recover. Johnson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. (192w, Neb.) 17&
N. W. 926.
It seems well settled that a payment of a smaller sum in satisfaction of a larger,
past-due, liquidated indebtedness does not discharge the debt. Foakes v. Beers
(1884, H. L.) L. R. 9 A. C. 605; Hoidale v. Wood (19o4) 93 Minn. i9o, ioo N. W.
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11oo. But the payment of the amount conceded to be due upon a claim, the
remainder of which is in dispute, is good consideration for a release of the whole
claim. Tanner v. Merrill (1895) io8 Mich. 58, 65 N. W. 664; Janci v. Cerny
(1919) 287 Ill. 359, 122 N. E. 507; contra, Demeules v. Jewel Tea Co. (19o8) 103
Minn. 150, 114 N. W. 733. Before the legal principles pertaining to compromises
will apply there must be some bona fide dispute. Silander v. Gronna (i9o6) 15
N. D. 552, io8 N. W. 544; Isaacs v. Wishnick (1917) 136 Minn. 317, 62 N. W.
297. In the principal case there had been no dispute. It is interesting to note
that in believing that the other policy was not yet cancelled, the parties made a
mistake of law. Money paid under a mistake of law is said not to be recoverable
under the majority rule. Brisbane v. Dacres (1813, C. P.) 5 Taunt. 143; Alton
v. First National Bank (1892) 157 Mass. 341, 32 N. E. 228; contra, Northrop v.
Graves (1849) 19 Conn. 548. But courts, as in the instant case, often fail to
discuss or observe the point, and when they do, avoid what they consider an in-
equitable result by various expedients. For instance, by an intangible distinction
money paid under a mistake of fact induced by a mistake of law can be recovered.
King v. Doolittle (1858, Tenn.) i Head, 77; Freeman v. Curtis (1862) 51 Me. 140.
In the principal case the discharge is held invalid for lack of consideration; but
the decision may well be approved on the ground that the discharge was rendered
invalid by the mistake, thus further supporting the existing tendency to under-
mine the so-called rule as to money paid by mistake of law. The following cases
are in accord with the principal case. Goodson v. National Masonic Accident
Assn. (19o2) 91 Mo. App. 339; Mintzer v. Supreme Council A. L. H. (19o3,
Sup. C) 41 Misc. 512, 85 N. Y. Supp. 23.
CONTRACTs-ENUiSTmENT-SuIT BY A SoLDIER FOR PAY -The plaintiff brought
this action to recover pay for military service rendered by him. He enlisted in
September, 1914, under an Act which stated that the enlistment was for one year
or the duration of the war, the pay to be 6s. a day. He was later notified that
a mistake had been made and that he was a "regular," whose pay was only is. a
day and whose enlistment was for seven years with the colours and five years
with the reserve. The plaintiff, threatening to bring habeas corpus proceedings,
was discharged in January, I92o, and brought this action for breach of his con-
tract. The defendant demurred. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover.
Leaman v. The King (192o, K. B.) 36 T. L. R. 835.
The English courts consider enlistment as a contract which is terminable at
the will of the Crown. 25 Halsbury, Laws of England (1913) sec. 9o. This is
so even if the soldier has been promised a position for life. In re Tufnell (1876)
L. R. 3 Ch. 164. And the rule obtains even in the case of a civilian serving the
Crown. Dunn v. The Queen [1896] I Q. B. 116. Cases involving pay have been
subject to demurrer because the soldier has no contract with the Crown which can
be enforced in a civil suit. Mitchell v. The Queen [1896] 1 Q. B. 121. The Amer-
ican current of authority on the particular point in question is directly opposed
to the instant case. See 3 Cyc. 841. Enlistment has been held to be a valid contract
except that the person enlisted has changed his status regarding certain defenses
he may have had against the enforcement of an ordinary contract. In re Grimly
(189o) 137 U. S. 147, II Sup. Ct 54; In re Morrissey (1890) 137 U. S. 157, 11
Sup. Ct. 57. An action for pay was maintained even where the soldier was sus-
pended during the time for which he sought compensation. Conrad v. U. S. (1897)
32 Ct Cl. 139. The fact that a. contract is terminable at the will of one party does
not make it any the less binding on the other party. Pilkington v. Scott (1846)
15 M. & W. 655; see (192o) 29 YtLE LAW JOURNAL, 115. A sovereignty is under
no legal duty to fulfill its contracts unless the obligation results from a class of
liabilities specifically assumed. The court's only duty is to declare the legal duty
or privilege of the government. The distinction between the two opposing lines
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of authority, then, must be found in the fact that the United States in establishing
the Court of Claims and defining its jurisdiction has created for itself a wider
range of liabilities than the Crown has in England.
CRIMINAL LAW-RECENG STOLEN GOODS-TEST OF GUILTY KNoowLEDG-In a
prosecution for receiving stolen goods the defendant excepted to the following
instruction:, 'By the term 'knowing' that the property was stolen is meant such
knowledge as would put a reasonably prudent man, exercising ordinary caution,
on his guard, and would cause such a man exercising such caution to believe
that the property had been stolen." Held, that the instruction was-erroneous,
since the test should be, not that of a reasonably prudent man, but the state bf
mind of this particular defendant. State v. Ebbeller (1920, Mo.) = S. W. 396.
The test of the instant case'represents the weight of authority. A few juris-
dictions, however, hold that the defendant's belief that the goods received were
not stolen goods must be reasonable. State v. D'Adame (1912) 8z N. J. L. 315,
82 AtI. 52o; People v. Zinmer (1916) i74 App. Div.. 470, 16o N. Y. Supp. 459.
In many cases where one acts under-a mistake of fact his belief must be reason-
able to secure his immunity, as for example, in cases of unlawful homicide, crim-
inal assault and battery, and bigamy. Commonwealth v. Russogulo (IgIg) 263
Pa. 93, io6 Atl. i8o; Lesueur v. State (i9II) 176 Ind. 448, 95 N. E. 239; State v.
Bryson (1864) 6o N. C. 476; see.Paxton v. Boyer (1873) 67 Ill. i3, i34. On the
other hand, in a prosecution for larceny or robbery, the decision will be for the
defendant if it appears that he took the goods under a bona fide mistake of fact
whether reasonable or not. Commonwealth v. Stebbins -(1857) 74 Mass. 492;
State v. Wasson (I9O5) 126 Iowa, 320, ioi N. W. 1125. Although the cases do
not show why this distinction exists, it is probably based on the difference in the
relative values placed on life and property. The test of the instant case repre-
sents, perhaps, the better one; yet, if the jury should think the defendant's belief
unreasonable, they would be quite likely to find that he believed them to be stolen
and thereby would usually reach the same result as if the minority test had been
applied.
DAMAGEs-BANKS AN BANxING-LIABLITY OF BANK TO DEPOSITOR FOR THE
WRONGFUL DISHONOR OF. CHEcxs-The plaintiff mercantile firm brought this
action .against the defendant bank to recover damages on account of the bank's
refusal to .pay checks drawn by the plaintiff when sufficient funds had been
deposited to. cover the checks so drawn. On a previous appeal the court held
that the law. presumed substantial damage to a merchant or trader from the
wrongful dishonor of his check, for which reasonable and temperate damages
could be re'covered. At the-new trial the defendant produced evidence tending
to shQw that the plaintiff's credit was not injured. Held, that such evidence was
'admissible only in mitigation of damages, as there was a "conclusive presump-
tion" of substantial damages. First National Bank of Forest City v. McFall &
Co. (i9o, Ark) = S. W. 40.
"Debtor and creditor" does not adequately express the relation between the
hank and its depositor, for the bank is under a duty to honor its depositor's checks
up to the amount of the deposit, for failure to perform which the depositor has a
remedy in contract or in tort. See 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87o, note. If the action
is brought in contract, a recovery can be had for such damages only as are,
according to the usual course of things, the natural consequences of the breach.
Cf. Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 34i; (192o) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 354.
But if the" action is brought in tort, the wrongdoer must answer for all the
proximate cofisequences of his wrongful act, whether natural or not. I Sedgwick,
Damages (9th ed. 1912) 262. These statements of the rules usually are thought
to result in a broader scale of recovery in actions of tort. But it may perhaps be
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doubted whether they are anything more than the application of the same theory
of proximate cause to varying situations. See i Sedgwick, op. cit. 273-276,
criticising Hobbs v. Ry. (1875) L. R. io Q. B. ini (which limits damages against
a carrier on the theory that the action was one of contract). There are two
theories as to the nature of the defendant's tort. See Huffcut, Liability of a
Bank to Maker of a Check for the Wrongful Dishonor Thereof (1902) 2 Co..
L. REv. 193, 196. The weight of authority seems to consider it analogous to
slander of one in his profession. I. M. James Co. v. Bank (igoo) 1O5 Tenn. i,
58 S. W. 261. A few courts look upon banks as public agencies and hold them
liable on grounds of policy. Patterson v. Marine Bank (889) 130 Pa. 419, 433,
18 AtI. 632, 633. Whire the depositor is a merchant or trader, the general rule-is
in accord with the principal case in granting the plaintiff substantial damages
without proof of special damage. Rolin v. Steward (1854) 14 C. B. 594; Lorick
v. Palmetto Bank and Trust Co. (i9o6) 74 S. C. 185, 54 S. E. 2o6, 7 Ann.
Cas. 818, note. Where the depositor is not a merchant, there is a conflict. The
rule seems to allow the plaintiff to recover nominal damages only unless special
damage is proved. Bank v. Ober (igio, C. C. A. 8th) 178 Fed. 678; Bank v.
Milvain (1884) io Vict. L. R_ Law, 3. Many courts do not admit this distinction
and apply to the case of the ordinary depositor the general rule applicable to
traders. Bank v. MacKnight (19o7) 29 App. D. C. 580. The amount of sub-
stantial damages recoverable in such actions is generally termed temperate and
reasonable. Hilton v. Banking Co. (i9o7) 128 Ga. 30, 57 S..E. 78. In New York
the above rules do not apply unless the bank's act is malicious or willful. Davis
v. Bank (igoo) 5o App. Div. 21o, 63 N. Y. Supp. 764; Wildenberger v. Bank
(1919) 187 App. Div. 320, 175 N. Y. Supp. 43p. The language of the courts in
the principal case on the subject of presumptions is rather confusing, but the
decision seems to be in accord with the weight of authority. For collection of
authorities see (914) 78 CENT. L. J. 97; (i915) 3 CALIF. L. REv. 487; (1912)
21 YALE LAw JouRNAL, 61g.
EvmENcE-ADMIssImimTY OF EvmR-, EC OF HABIT TO PROvE CONTRIBUTORY NE-
LIGENcF--The plaintiff's husband was killed while driving an automobile, in a
collision with the defendant's car. An eye-witness testified as to the circum-
stances of the accident. 'The defendant offered evidence that the deceased had,
by reputation, a habit of becoming intoxicated and driving his automobile reck-
lessly while in such condition. . Held, that the deceased was guilty of contributory
negligence, and that the evidence offered was admissible on that issue. Southern
Traction Co. v. Kirksey (i92o, Tex.) 222 S. W. 702.
It is well settled that evidence of character is not admissible in a civil action,
chiefly because it is of- slight probative value and tends to confuse the issues.
i Greenleaf, Evidence (I6th ed. 1899) 40 ff.; 22 C. J. 470. Evidence of a habit
of intoxication or of negligence sufficiently constant to be of probative value is
difficult to distinguish from evidence of character.. i Wigmore, Evidence (1904)
secs. 96, 97. Evidence of a general habit of drunkenness has been held irrelevant
on the question of contributory negligence. Great Northern Ry. v. Ennis (igi6,
C. C. A. gth) 236 Fed. 17. But evidence of a habit of doing a particular act neg-
ligently has been admitted. Hodges v. Hill (1913) 175 Mo. App. 441, 161 S. W.
633; contra, M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Jbhnson (1898) 92 Tex. 380, 48 S. W. 568.
The habit involved in the instant case is apparently on the border-line between
the two mentioned above. It would seem to be of very slight probative value in
determining the conduct of the deceased on this particular occasion, especially
when direct evidence showed what that conduct was. In such circumstances evi-
dence of habit offered to prove the absence of negligence is generally excluded.
Zucker v. Whitridge (1912) 205 N. Y. 50, 98 N. E. 209, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 683,
note. And there appears to be no reason why the same rule should not apply on
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the question of proving contributory negligence. Although there is much conflict
of authority, the decision in the instant case seems contrary to previous Texas
decisions and to the better rule.
EVIDENcE-PROVINcE OF THE CouRx-QuEsTIoNs BY A JUDGE TO A WITNESS.-
The defendant was convicted of rape. He appealed and assigned as one ground
of error that the court undertook the examination of one of the witnesses and
thereby prejudiced the jury. Held, that the examination by the judge was error.
State v. Sandquist (192o, Minn.) 178 N. W. 883.
The general rule of the orthodox common law, and of the majority of juris-
dictions in the United States, is that the judge has not only the power to examine
witnesses, but that he is under a duty to do so when it appears that the witness is
evasive, diffident, or ignorant. He may even call new witnesses of his own vo-
lition, if he feels that the whole truth has not been disclosed. In so acting, how-
ever, he must so frame his questions that he gives no impression of partiality to
the jury. Adler v. United States (igio, C. C. A. 5th) 182 Fed. 464; Dutton v.
Territory (gio) 13 Ariz. 7, io8 Pac. 224; I Wigmore, Evidence (1904) sec. 784.
The same rule applies to civil as well as to criminal cases. Eekhout v. Cole
(1904) 135 N. C. 583, 47 S. E. 655. In the instant case, the court would limit the
judge to questions in only rare and unusual instances. It is submitted that the
correct decision was reached, since there was an indication of partiality on the
part of the judge, but as a general rule the judge should have wider powers than
the language of the court suggests.
INSURANCE-MARINE INSURER LIABLE FOR UNREPAIRED DAMAGE ALTHOUGH SHIP
wAs LATER TOTALLY LOST THROUGH AN ExcEmrEz PERIL.--The plaintiff's steamship
Eastlands was insured by the defendant under a time policy against perils of the
seas only, including particular average. She had been requisitioned by the
Admiralty and was under a charter-party to the government, which undertook to
pay the value of the ship, at the time she was lost, if a loss was occasioned by war
risks. During the currency of the policy, she was damaged by perils of the seas,
only part of which damage had been repaired when she was torpedoed and be-
came a total loss. In an action .on the policy, the issue was as to the liability of
the defendant for the unrepaired damage. Held in the Court of Appeal, that the
defendant was liable. Wilson Shipping Co. Ltd. v. British & Foreign Marine
Ins. Co. [192o] 2 K. B. 25.
The defendant's argument, adopted in the King's Bench Division, was that it
was not liable because the partial loss was merged in the total loss from an
excepted peril. In 18io Lord Ellenborough formulated the rule that "where the
property deteriorated is afterwards totally lost to the assured, and the previous
deterioration becomes ultimately a matter of perfect indifference to his interests,
he cannot make it the ground of a claim against the underwriters." Livie v.
Janson (i8io) I2"East, 648, 654. It was unsuccessfully attempted to interpret this
rule as meaning that an insurer is not liable for unrepaired damages in any case
where the subject-matter is later wholly lost by an excepted peril before termina-
tion of the risk. Knight v. Faith (i85o) 15 Q. B. 649; Pitman v. Universal
Marine Ins. Co. (1882) L. R. 9 Q. B. 192; but see 17 Halsbury, Laws of England,
469; 5 Joyce, Insurance (2nd. ed. x918) sec. 3o16; 2 Arnould, Marine Insurance
(9th ed. 1914) 1290. In an early dictum this interpretation was recognized as the
law in America. See Rice v. Homer (1815) 12 Mass. 229, 234. The holding in
the instant case properly emphasizes that a defense on the grounds of merger of
damages will be sustained only where the insured is ultimately not prejudiced by
the prior partial loss. It should be termed a doctrine of merger of damages, not
merger of losses, because its basis is want of damnification. The reason for the
rule is that insurance is essentially a contract of indemnity and is not a contract
for the payment of a sum of money on the happening of a certain event.
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PRACTIcE-NEw TRIAL-GENERAL VERDICT SUPPORTED BY ONE GOOD SPECIFICA-
TION OF NEGLIGENCE STANDS, THOUGH OTHERS INSUFFICIENT.-The plaintiff's auto-
mobile was damaged by striking a "silent policeman" lying in the street. He sued
the defendant on two specifications of negligence in the maintenance of its high-
ways: (I) in placing a guidepost in the street; (2) in allowing it to remain there
after being knocked over. The trial court submitted both specifications of negli-
gence to the jury, and a general verdict was rendered for the plaintiff. Held, that
the general verdict must stand, since there were facts warranting a finding of
negligence in allowing the guidepost to remain in the street after it had been
knocked over, although placing it there was not in itself negligence. Aaronson
v. City of New Haven (1920, Conn.) 1IO Atl. 872.
Where there are two or more causes of action each giving rise to separate
damages, the universal rule is that a general verdict will not stand where there is
one bad count. King v. Beaumier (1918, Wyo.) 174 Pac. 612; Hunt et al. v. C.
B. & Q. Ry. (1914) 95 Neb. 746, 146 N. W. 986; Leverone v. Arancio (IgoI)
179 Mass. 439, 61 N. E. 45. The English courts have applied this rule in cases
where there is only one cause of action stated in several counts. Grant v. Astle
(1781, K. B.) 2 Doug. 722; see Hambleton v. Veere (1662, K. B.) - Saunders
Part 2, 169, 171a, note; I Chitty, Pleading (16th Am. ed. 1879) 426, 427. But the
rule has been lamented by Lord Mansfield. Grant v. Astle (1781, K. B.) 2 Doug.
73o. However, in an action for slander if all the words were spoken at one time
and laid in one count, a general verdict will be sustained, although some of the
words were not actionable. See Havnbleton v. Veere (1662, K. B.) 2 Saunders
Part 2, i69, 171d, note. This is somewhat analogous to the principal case where
there are two specifications of negligence for one cause of action. Connecticut
and South Carolina seem to have always had a rule contrary to the English one,
applying to one cause of action stated in several counts. Lewi.* v. Niles (1792,
Conn.) I Root, 433; Neil v. Lewis (1798, S. C.) 2 Bay, 2o4. There appears to be
no practical reason for distinguishing between a cause of action stated with each
specification of negligence in a separate count, and the same cause of action stated
with all the specifications in one count The weight of authority in the United
States is against the rule of the instant case. Fowkes v. I. I. Threshing Machine
Co. et al. (1915) 46 Utah, 5o2, 151 Pac. 53; Wrought Iron Wrange Co. v. Zeitz
(1917) 64 Colo. 87, 170 Pac. 181. But various states have seen fit to incorporate
it in their statutes. Blanchard v. Vermont Shade Roller Co. (1911) 84 Vt. 442,
79 Atl. gii; see Gen. Laws of Vt. (1917) 1799; Pete Pochco v. Illinois Terminal
Ry. (1918) 210 Ill. App. 598; see Puterbough, Pleading & Practice, Common
Law Forms (gth ed. 1917) 1153. While in others it seems to be the common-law
rule. Owens v. Hannibal and St. Joseph Ry. (1874) 58 Mo. 386. The presump-
tion under the English theory is that only sufficient issues were found to give the
verdict for the plaintiff; therefore, if one specification is unsupported by the
evidence the verdict must be reversed, as there is no way of telling on what issue
or issues the jury based theipverdict. On the other hand, the presumption in the
principal case is that all issues were found for the plaintiff; therefore, one good
specification will support the verdict. Where separate verdicts on each count or
special interrogatories are allowed, the rule in the principal case merely puts the
burden of asking for them on the defendant if he does not wish to risk a general
verdict. In close questions of fact it may do injustice if separate verdicts are not
demanded. But if recognized as a rule, the fault will then be with the party fail-
ing to request them. On the whole this rule tends to prevent retrials.
PROPERTY-UNPATENTED INVENTION NOT "PROPERTY" OF JUDGMENT DBToL-
The defendant, a judgment debtor, claimed to have invented a device for sound
production, and to have constructed models thereof, which had not been patented
or made public. Proceedings supplementary to execution were brought under the
YALE LAW JOURNAL
New York Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a debtor may be ex-
amined "concerning his property." Held, that the defendant's ideas were not
"property," and that the defendant was under no duty to give information.
Rosenthal v. Goldstein (192, Sup. Ct) 183 N. Y. Supp. 582.
A patent right is the personal property of the patentee. Schouler, Personal
Property (5th ed. i918) sec. 64. Under the procedure in most jurisdictions, such
property may be reached by means of a creditor's bill in equity or proceedings
supplementary to execution. Barnes v. Morgan (1875, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 3 Hun.
703; see Gillett v. Bate (i881) 86 N. Y. 87, 92. And equity has the power to
compel an assignment of patent rights to the creditor. In re Cantelo Mfg. Co.
(1912, D. Me.) 2o1 Fed. 158; Vail v. Hammond (i89i) 6o Conn. 374, 22 Atl. 954.
A different situation exists, however, where the patent rights have been applied
for by the debtor, but have not as yet been granted. The courts at one time hesi-
tated to hold that the inchoate monopoly rights of the inventor at this point con-
stituted his "property." In re McDonnell (igoo, N. D. Iowa) ior Fed. 239; In re
Dann (i9o4, N. D. Ill.) 129 Fed. 495. Recent decisions, however, allow the
creditor to reach these rights of the debtor. In re Cantelo Mfg. Co. (igi,
D. Me.) i85 Fed. 276; In re Myers-Wolf Mfg. Co. (913, C. C. A. 3d) 205 Fed.
289. A third situation is presented by the principal case, where the debtor has
not as yet applied for patent rights. The possessor of an unpatented invention
has, in addition to the power given him by statute to acquire a monopoly, rights
that others shall not by fraud or by breach of confidence "steal" his secret.
Peabody v. Norfolk (1868) 98 Mass. 452; Tabor v. Hoffman (I889) 1I8 N. Y. 30,
23 N. E. 12. He also has the power of assigning these powers and rights. See
Cammeyer v. Newtbn (876) 94 U. S. 225, 226; Vulcan Detinning Co. v. American
Can Co. (i9o4) 67 N. J. Eq. 243, 247, 58 At. 290, 291. The original possessor of
the invention and his assignees are under the liability that another, by independent
search in good faith, will discover the secret, obtain a patent, and thus destroy
their powers and rights. Nevertheless, similar rights and powers, however un-
certain their duration; have been held to constitute "property." The right to the
use of trade secrets and formulae has been protected in that guise. Green v.
.Polgbam (1823, Ch.) I Sim. & Stu. 398; Simmons Medicine Co. v. Simmons
(1897, E. D. Ark.) 8I Fed. 163. The right to the exclusive use of financial news
for fifteen minutes after its receipt has also been held to be "property." Kiernan
v. Manhattan Quotation Telegraph Co. (1876, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 5o How. Pr. 194;
see International News Service v. Associated Press (1918) 248 U. S. 215, 235,
39 Sup. Ct. 68, 71; and COMMENTS (i919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 387, 388. And
dicta in several cases have upheld the view that unpatented inventions, especially
where the secret has been worked into blue-prints or models, are "property" which
a creditor can reach. See Fisher v. Cu.shman (19o0, C. C. A. Ist) io3 Fed. 860,
866. The weight of authority, however, with which the instant case is in accord,
refuses to recognize an inventor's rights in relation to his unpatented secret, as
"property" which a creditor may reach in proceedings supplementary to execution.
SALES-PAssING OF TITLE--CHECK GIVEN AS CONDITIONAL PAYMENT.-Hogs
were purchased at an agreed price to be paid by check at the time of delivery,
which was to be made to the vendee or his agent. The hogs were delivered, and
a check was given in payment which was presented in due course and dishonored.
The vendee had, in the meantime, shipped the hogs to the plaintiff, who in turn
had sold them. Upon the dishonor of the check, the vendor demanded of the
plaintiff the proceeds of the second sale, under a claim of ownership. At about
the same time, a creditor of the vendee commenced an action against him and
attached the said proceeds in the hands of the plaintiff. The latter thereupon
commenced this action in interpleader against the vendor, the vendee, and the
creditor of the vendee. Held, that the vendor had the right to the proceeds,
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because title to the hogs never passed to the vendee. South San Francisco Pack-
ing & Provision Co. v. Jacobsen (1920, Calif.) i9o Pac. 628.
The time when title is to pass under the terms of a contract of sale is governed
by the intentions of the parties, gathered from the terms of the contract and the
attendant circumstances. Furrow v. Bair (igg, W. Va.) ioo S. E. 5o6; Groves
v. Warren (1919) 226 N. Y. 459, 123 N. E. 659. Where in a cash sale, as in the
instant case, a check is given, its payment may be intended as a condition prece-
dent to the passing of title. The dishonor of the check after delivery of the
goods, gives the vendor the immediate right to possession of the goods. ' Quality
Shingle Co. v. Old Oregon Lumber & Shingle Co. (192o, Wash.) 187 Pac. 705;
Segrist v. Crabtree (1889) 131 U. S., 287, 9 Sup. Ct. 687. It has been held, how-
ever, that where the delivery authorizes the vendee to use the goods immediately,
in the absence of pretty clear evidence to the contrary the title should be regarded
as having passed. See Kemper Grain Co. v. Harbour (1913) 89 Kan. 824, 834,
133 Pac. 565, 568, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 173, note; Williston, Sales (9o9) 557.
But if the check was given in absolute payment, the title passed immediately and
the vendor may sue on the check. Segrist v. Crabtree, supra. He also has the
alternative remedy of suing for the price. Olcese v. Mobile Fruit & Trading Co.
(1904) 211 III. 539, 71 N. E. 1O84; cf. Silverstin v. Kohler (1919, Calif.) 183 Pac.
451; Williston, Sales (1909) 943. If he elects to sue for the price, he can not
dispute the vendee's title. Williston, Sales (igog) 951, 962. In case similar to the
instant case, business custom would seem to treat the check as absolute payment,
and therefore the title would pass upon the giving of the check at the time of
delivery. But the decision here would be the same, because upon dishonor of
the check the vendor would be regarded as having rescinded the contract and
having asserted his right to the proceeds from the sale of the goods in question.
TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-STATE INHERITANCE TAX NOT DEDucrIL--
The plaintiff paid under protest the federal income tax for the year 1913, claiming
that the inheritance tax of the state of New York, taid upon a legacy during the
year, should have been allowed as a deduction under sec. B of the Income Tax
Act, 38 Stat. at L. 167, exempting "all . . . state . . . taxes paid within the
year." The plaintiff now sues for the return of that portion of the income tax
alleged to have been illegally assessed. Held, that a demurrer to the complaint
was properly sustained, as the inheritance tax is nota tax paid by the legatee, but
is a charge against the corpus of the estate. Prentiss v. Eisner (June 16, i92o,
C. C. A. 2nd) 64 N. Y. L. J. Oct. 9, i90.
This case upholds the decision of the District Court. Prentiss v. Eisner (1919,
S. D. N. Y.) 26o Fed. 589; Treas. Dec. 2933 (Oct. 9, 1919). It accords with a
previous Treasury regulation that state inheritance taxes are -not permissible de-
ductions. (1919) 45 Regs. Treas. Dept., Art. 134. The decision depends upon the
view that an inheritance tax is not upon property, but is upon the decedent's
power to dispose of it by will and that not until it has yielded its contribution to
the state can the bequest vest in the legatee. United States v. Perkins (1895)
163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct. 1O73; State v. Dalrymple (1889) 70 Md. 294, 17 AtlE 82;
McKennan's Estate (igio) 25 S. D. 369, 126 N. W. 611. See (1918) 27 YALE LAW
JOURNAL, 1055, note. For if construed as a property tax, the act would be uncon-
stitutional. Cope's Estate (1899) 191 Pa. I, 43 Atl. 79; In re Pel's Estate (19o2)
171 N. Y. 48, 63 N. E. 789. Some courts, however, have held it a tax on" the
privilege to receive. State v. Bazille (i9o5) 97 Minn. ii, io6 N. W. g3; Gels-
thorpe v. Furnell (897) 20 Mont. 299, 51 Pac. 267. If it is correct that the
power to devise property is due to legislative grant, the former would seem to be
the more logical view, for these legal relations in fact result immediately from
legislative action, whereas the privilege and right to receive under the devise
depend upon the action of an individual. Only as a consequence of the power to
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devise does the privilege to receive devises exist. Under any construction, it
is a tax upon the power of transmitting property by will. Union Trust Co. v.
Durfee (igol) 125 Mich. 487, 84 N. W. IioI; Stixrud's Estate (1910) 58 Wash.
339, lO9 Pac. 343; see Beers, Inheritance Taxes in New York (1914) 14 COL. L.
Rxv. 237 ff. In spite of the confusion of opinion on the subject and even though
the distinction between property and succession is perhaps only made to avoid
general constitutional limitations, the theory of the decision seems sound. See
Gleason & Otis, Inheritance Taxation (1917) 11; see NOTES (1918) 18 COL. L.
REv. 475. For descent is a creature of statute and not a natural right. State v.
Hamlin (1894) 86 Me. 495, 3o At. 76; 2 Blackstone, Commentaries ii; see
United States v. Perkins (1895) 163 U. S. 625, 627, 16 Sup. Ct. 1073, 1075. The
payment of the sum desired by the sovereign power is then a condition precedent
to the acquisition of ownership of the remainder by the legatee. The ruling of
the commissioner of internal revenue in the instant case states that the inherit-
ance tax could not be deducted in computing the income tax liability of the estate
itself. Upon the theory of the instant case this seems to be sound, for the tax
is not upon the estate of the decedent. Similarly, federal estate taxes are not
deductible.' But interest paid with respect to deferred payments of such taxes
would be deductible. See Holmes, Federal Taxes (1920) 79, 367.
TORTs-CoLLEcTING DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES ON ONe's P~mxisSs-RuLx iN Ry-
LANDS V. FLETcHm.-The defendants had collected great quantities of di-nitro-
phenol (D.N.P.) upon their premises for use in the manufacture of picric acid.
The evidence tended to show that this substance, which had previously been
used chiefly in dyeing processes, was stable, hard to ignite, and not considered a
dangerous explosive unless collected in great quantities and subjected to intense
heat. Some nitrate of soda, a highly oxidized substance, had been stored in the
same room containing this D.N.P., and a fire that started amongst the nitrate of
soda containers spread to those of the D.N.P. This caused it to explode and
damage the plaintiff's property, for which this action was brought. Held, that
the defendants were liable under the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher without
considering the question of nuisance or negligence. Younger, L. J., dissenting.
Belvedere Fish Guano Co. Ltd. v. Rainham Chemical Works Ltd. [1920, C. A.]
2 K. B. 487.
The doctrine of Rylands v,. Fletcher has not been generally followed in this
country. It has been ably criticised and repudiated in many jurisdictions. Brouzn
v. Collins (1873) 53 N. H. 442; Losee v. Buchanan (1873) 51 N. Y. 476. The
doctrine, however, has met with approval in a few states where the principle has
been applied to cases involving blasting operations and those where gas, oil, water,
or explosives have been collected upon the defendant's land and by their escape
have caused damage to neighboring premises. Brennan Construction Co. v.
Cumberland (19o7) 29 App. D. C. 554, 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 535, note; Weaver
Mercantile Co. v. Thurmond (1911) 68 W. Va. 530, 70 S. E. 126; see (1916)
25 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 68r. But generally wherever the principle has been ap-
plied, the same result would probably have been reached without it. See Bohlen,
The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1911) 59 U. oF P. L. REV. 433; Thayer,
Liability Without Fault (1916) 29 HARv. L. Rav. 8ox. There has been a growing
tendency to limit the application of this doctrine to unusual and extraordinary
uses of land, even in jurisdictions where it has been most generally accepted.
Ainsworth v. Lakin (19o2) 18o Mass. 397, 62 N. E. 746; City Water Co. v. City
of Fergus Falls (igio) 113 Minn. 33, 128 N. W. 817. The principal case, like
similar ones lately decided, shows that the English courts still consider Rylands
v. Fletcher good law, despite the severe criticism it has undergone; and that
there may no longer be the "manifest inclination" that Sir Frederick Pollock
spoke of, to discover something in the facts of the case to take it out of that rule.
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See (1918) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 965; Pollock, Law of Fraud in British Indies
(1894) 53. The instant case might well have been decided on grounds of negli-
gence, as the concurring opinion of Atkins, L. J., intimated, and while the case
appears to have been properly decided, yet decisions unnecessarily based upon
such broad grounds of liability cannot be said to aid in the progress of the law.
TORTS-NFGLIGENCE-AILiOAD'S DUTY TO A TRaspAssaa-While passing around
a train which was blocking a public crossing, the plaintiff was struck by another
train, operated by the defendant's servants. The evidence tended to show that it
was customary for people of the city to pass around trains obstructing this cross-
ing, not only with the flagman's consent, but even at his suggestion. As a result
there was a well beaten path at the place where the injury occurred. There was
no other evidence of contributory negligence. The lower court found for the
plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff should recover, since under the circumstances
the defendant by its servants was under a duty to anticipate the presence of persons
upon the tracks and to exercise special care and watchfulness to avoid injury to
them. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. Jones (192o, Okla.) 19o Pac. 385.
The majority doctrine imposes no affirmative duty to provide against injury to
a trespasser until after his presence is known. Cleveland, etc. Ry. v. Tartt (1900,
C. C. A. 7th) 99 Fed. 369; 2 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence (6th ed. 1913)
ch. 21. Some courts have held that even then the only duty is to refrain from wil-
ful and wanton acts likely to result in his injury. Ellington v. Great Northern Ry.
(19o5) 96 Minn. 176, IO4 N. W., 827; Tabor v. Phila. & R. Ry. (1920, Pa.) 1io Atl.
167. Others have held that there is a duty to exercise ordinary care. Baltimore
& 0. Ry. v. State (1911) 114 Md. 536, 8o Ati. 17o; Ingram v. Jackson (1917)
2o6 Ill. App. 466. The fact that the place where the accident occurred is habitu-
ally used by the public with acquiescence by the railroad, is often said to impose
no greater duty upon the company, and to make the users no more than bare
licensees with only the rights of trespassers. Griswold v. Boston & M. Ry.
(19o3) 183 Mass. 424, 67 N. E. 354; Pittsburgh, etc. Ry. v. Philpott (1920, Ind.)
127 N. E. 827. What constitutes wanton and wilful acts towards such a person
is a question for the jury, but the mere failure to exercise ordinary care to pre-
vent injury after a trespasser's presence is known, may under special circum-
stances amount to wantonness. Tice v. Cent. of Ga. Ry. (192o, Ga.) lO3 S. E.
262; Petrowski et al. v. Phila. & R. Ry. (1919) 263 Pa. 531, lO7 Atl. 381. Op-
posed to the foregoing line of authority is a growing minority doctrine which
holds that with respect to any place on or near the tracks of a railroad where it
is known trespassers are accustomed to be, there is a duty upon the company's
servants to anticipate their presence, keep a reasonable lookout, and use ordinary
care to avoid injury to them. Donovan v. South & North Ala. Ry. (1887) 84 Ala.
141, 4 So. 142; Louisville & N. Ry. v. Clore (1919) 183 Ky. 261, 209 S. W. 55.
The reason for this is often said to be that long and continued use by the public
with the railroad's consent and acquiescence ripens into an implied license and
gives to the users the rights of licensees. Anderson v. Chicago, etc. (1894) 87
Wis. 195, 58 N. W. 79; St. Louis S. W. Ry. v. Douthit (1919, Texas) 2o8 S. W.
2oi. While the nature of the locality within which the user arises is an im-.
portant factor, it is not necessary that the place be within the limits of a city.
The number of persons, however, using the way may well be taken as a criterion
of such a use as should impose the duty of a look out. Louisville & N. Ry. v.
Vaughn's Adm'rs (1919) 183 Ky. 829, 2IO S. W. 938. After discovering a tres-
passer apparently possessed of all the human faculties, the employees in charge
may presume that he will conduct himself so as to avoid injury, and need not at
once resort to emergency steps. Campbell v. Kansas City etc. Ry. (i895) 55 Kan.
536, 4o Pac. 997; Elder v. Idaho-Wash. Ry. (1914) 26 Idaho 209, 141 Pac. 985.
But if collateral circumstances negative the presumption that the trespasser has
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knowledge of his danger, those in charge of the train must make every effort, con-
sistent with the safety of the passengers, to stop it Hines, Director General v.
Angle (1920, C. C. A. 5th) 264 Fed. 497. The majority doctrine is based upon the
broad principle that since the track is the exclusive property of the railroad, it
may expect it to be clear and-presume that no one will trespass on it. But this
presumption is usually a fiction inconsistent with the known facts and the minor-
ity doctrine adopted by the principal case seems more reasonable and more just.
TORTS-UNIONS-EXPULSION OF MEMBER WITHOUT NOTICE, CONTRARY TO NATLAL
JusTicE.-When the plaintiff's report as treasurer of a local branch of the union
showed irregularities which were violations of a by-law, theexecutive committee
passed a resolution removing him from office and making him ineligible to hold
any other office for five years. This occurred without notice to him and without
giving him an opportunity to defend. The plaintiff asked for an injunction to
restrain the enforcement of this resolution. Held, that he was entitled to relief,
since such action was contrary to natural justice. Burn v. National Amalgamated
Labourers' Union [ig2o] 2 Ch. 364.
The principles involved in the action of the executive committee are the same
as if it had expelled the plaintiff without notice and an opportunity to be heard.
In cases of this character the court has no jurisdiction unless property rights
are involved, although it may justify the plaintiff and then deny jurisdiction.
Pound, Equitable Relief against Defamation and Injuries to Personality (1917)
29 HARv. L. Rxv. 679. Granting jurisdiction, the court will not interfere where
notice and an opportunity to be heard have been given. Byram v. Sovereign
Camp (1899) io8 Iowa, 430, 79 N. W. -144. Where the expelled member has not
had a chance to defend himself, the court will generally interfere in his behalf.
State v. Seattle Baseball Association (191o) 6I Wash. 79, I1 Pac. 1055. Two
theories have been advanced. The English view is that the expulsion is contrary to
natural justice. Parr v. Lancashire & Cheshire Miners' Federation 1913] I Ch.
366. Many American cases have adopted the English view, one case translating
the wording into "fair play". William v. Randolph (i9o5) 48 Misc. 96, 96 N. Y.
Supp. 644. Other cases have stressed a contractual relation between the associa-
tion and the member, the terms depending upon the by-laws, which govern their
relations. See Krause v. Sander (191o) 66 Misc. 6oi, 602, i2z N. Y. Supp. 54, 56.
Where the by-laws provide for notice and an opportunity to be heard, it would
seem to make no difference along which line the case is decided, and many'cases
have combined the two. Universal Lodge No. r4, F. and A. M. v. Valentine
('9g) 134 Md. 505, lO7 At. 531. Where the by-laws are vague as to the neces-
sity' of a hearing, it is not entirely contrary to the contract theory to imply such
a provision, and most cases do so. Richards v. Morison (1918) 229 Mass. 458,
118 N. E. 868. Only two cases have been found which carry the contract theory
to its more logical conclusion and allow the parties to deal with each other strictly
in accordance with the by-laws. Manning v. San Antonio Club (1885) 63 Tex.
166; Levy v. Magnolia Lodge No. 29 L 0. 0. F. (1895) 11o Calif. 297, 42 Pac.
887. But opposed to this view one case has said that a by-law which specifically
made notice unnecessary would be bad. See Ludowski v. Benevolent Society
(1888) 89 Mo. App. 337, 339. It would seem that on joining an association, the
new member, as a practical matter, does not know the provisions of the by-laws,
nor does he generally have an opportunity to know them before he is admitted.
Therefore expulsion should not be governed by the terms of the contract, but
rather by laws of natural justice, and it would seem that the instant case, in
basing its decision on this ground, supports the better view.
TRUSTS-RIGHiTS oF CBEiToRs oF CESTUI-EFFEcT OF SrATu m-Mrs. B by her
will bequeathed securities valued at $25,ooo to a trust company, in trust to pay
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the income to her husband, "so that the same shall not be liable for the contracts,
debts, . . . etc. of my said husband." At the time the will was executed, her
husband was indebted to the plaintiff upon a judgment in the sum of $24,717.85.
Her husband, because of his advanced age, was unable to support himself. An
existing statute provided that where the income of a trust fund was not "ex-
pressly given for the support of the beneficiary," such income should be liable
in equity to the claims of his creditors. The plaintiff prayed that a decree might
issue requiring the trust company to pay the income to the plaintiff until the debt
was satisfied. Held, that the decree should issue, since the trust did not come
within the terms of the statute. Gager, J., dissenting. - Carter v. Brownell
(I92o, Conn.) III AtI. 182.
That the regulation of spendthrift trusts by legislation has proved to be a
difficult task, has been amply illustrated by results in New York. See Gray,
Restraints on Alienation (2d ed. 1895) secs. 282 ff. Nevertheless, a number of
states have enacted statutes similar to that in New York. These generally pro-
vide that surplus income above what is necessary for the support and education
of the cestui should be liable to the claims of creditors. Mich. Comp. Laws
1897, sec. 8841; N. D. Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 5369; Conn. Rev. St. 1918, sec.
5874. In at least one case the income exempted is limited to a definite sum.
N. C. Gen. St. (igo5) sec. 1588. Other states limit these trusts to cases where
the cestui is non compos mentis or under some other disability. Ga. Code (igi)
sec. 3729; Ariz. Rev. St. (i915) sec. 1224; see Me. Rev. St., ch. 64, sec. 4. It is
evident that the object of this legislation is affirmatively to recognize that there
are cases where such income should be exempt, but to prevent the exemption from
liability for debts from being extended beyond well-defined limits. See Steib v.
Whithead (1884) 111 Ill. 247, 252. Where spendthrift trusts are sustained, in the
absence of a statute, it has been held that they need not be provided for in express
terms, but that it is sufficient if the intention is clearly to be gathered from the
instrument construed in the light of circumstances. Baker v. Brown (i888) 146
Mass. 369, i5 N. E. 783. Cf. Bennett v. Bennett (i9o5) 217 Ill. 434, 75 N. E. 339.
In the instant case the court was precluded from such interpretation by the
wording of the statute. If one of the purposes of permitting spendthrift trusts
is to provide for the support of those who are unable to support themselves, and
who would otherwise become a burden on the state, it would seem that in this
case the unfortunate wording of the statute has defeated the purpose for which
it was enacted.
